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After two years of research, rethinking, and debate, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) has endorsed a new “institutional view” on capital account liberalization and the 
management of capital flows. This new view, which received an IMF Executive board-level 
endorsement, will give official guidance to IMF surveillance and reporting efforts.  
In 2011 the Pardee Center Task Force on Regulating Global Capital flows recommended that 
the goal for emerging market and developing nations should be to ensure that surges and 
sudden stops of external capital flows do not jeopardize national development priorities. 
Therefore, the Task Force noted, nations should have the policy space to deploy a package 
of measures that mitigates the risks and optimizes the benefits of external capital flows in a 
counter-cyclical manner. To that end, the Task Force recommended a set of “rules of thumb” 
for nations seeking to regulate capital flows for long-run development (see Box 2). 
The IMF’s new view is a major step forward for an institution that once advocated mandatory 
capital account liberalization worldwide, thanks in large part to the insistence of emerging 
market and developing country IMF members and some innovative economists within the 
Fund. However, those voices did not totally prevail and taken as a whole, the new view is still 
out of step with country experience and current economic thinking in important respects. The 
major steps forward are:
•   The IMF now recognizes that capital flows carry risks and that the liberalization of capital 
flows before nations reach a certain threshold of financial and institutional development 
can accentuate those risks.
•   The IMF now acknowledges that under certain circumstances, cross-border capital flows 
should be regulated to avoid the worst effects of capital flow surges and sudden stops.
•   The IMF rightly says that nations that are the source of excessive capital flows should pay 
more attention to the potentially negative spillover effects of their macroeconomic policies.
•   The IMF boldly notes that its new view on capital flow management may be at odds with 
other international commitments, such as in trade and investment treaties, that restrict the 
ability to regulate cross-border finance.
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However, the IMF’s view on these matters suffers from at least five shortcomings that will be 
discussed in greater detail in this policy brief:
•   Despite econometric evidence and country experience to the contrary, the IMF still sees 
capital account liberalization as the end goal for macro economic policy.
•   The conditions under which the IMF approves the regulations on capital flows are overly 
narrow and not consistent with economic theory, analysis and country experience.
•   The IMF still puts the majority of the burden on emerging market and developing countries, 
and does not balance such an approach with solid analysis and recommendations 
regarding how source countries should regulate capital flows.
•   The IMF pays little attention as to how nations should design, monitor, and enforce capital 
account regulations.
•   The IMF view gives little guidance regarding how nations should cooperate on regulating 
capital flows or how nations should respond to the conflicting sets of recommendations 
and rules they receive from the IMF versus other international commitments.
This brief will discuss the main features of the new IMF view on capital flows and expand on 
some of the shortcomings identified above.
The iMFs ‘new’ View on capital Flows
In the 1990s the IMF embarked on an initiative to provide an explicit mandate for capital 
account liberalization and to gain jurisdiction over members’ capital account policies. What 
a difference a few crises makes. In December of 2012, the IMF released an Executive-board 
endorsed new ‘institutional view” on the management of cross-border financial flows (IMF 
2012b). The new view on capital flows is part of a broader set of changes that the IMF has put 
forth on macroeconomic policy in the wake of the financial crisis (Grabel 2011). 
The IMF remains wedded to the eventual liberalization of a country’s capital account, but it 
now recognizes that the idea of free transfers of investments rests on much weaker ground 
than does the case for free trade. The IMF now sees that nations need to cross a certain 
institutional threshold first, one that many emerging market and developing countries have 
not yet reached. What is more, the IMF now acknowledges that there are risks as well as 
benefits to cross-border financial flows. Capital flows are particularly prone to sharp inflow 
surges followed by sudden stops that can cause a great deal of financial instability.  The 
new IMF view says nations could even use ‘capital controls,’ reframed as “Capital Flow 
Management Measures (CFMs),” on previously deregulated portions of their capital account 
if done alongside other macroeconomic policies such as: interest rate and fiscal policy 
management, the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, and macro-prudential financial 
regulations. Even under such circumstances, capital controls should generally not discriminate 
on the basis of currency1. 
The IMF reiterates its support of capital account liberalization as a long-run goal, but qualifies 
that support. The IMF now states that capital account liberalization is only optimal after 
a nation has reached a certain threshold of financial and economic development and that 
liberalization should be sequenced, gradual, and not the same for all countries at all times. 
Indeed, it offers a sequenced, stepwise process for the liberalization of capital flows  
for its members.
1  Measures have been called a variety of terms (see Epstein et al 2008). “Capital controls” “capital flow 
management measures (CFMs)”  “capital account regulations (CARs)” and “capital management 
techniques (CMTs)” are used interchangeably throughout this brief.
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IMF’s view is that capital controls can be part of the liberalization and sequencing. The IMF’s 
guidelines on inflows recommend that countries deploy capital controls only as a last resort — that 
is, after such measures as building up reserves, letting currencies appreciate, and cutting budget 
deficits. The Fund recommends that controls not be discriminatory among residents. And it also 
recommends guidelines for the use of controls on capital outflows, arguing that by and large they 
should not be used but can be considered in crisis or near crisis conditions (IMF 2012a, b). 
This new IMF is not brand new however. It elevates and clarifies the general view held since the 
early 2000s. In 2005 the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) conducted an assessment 
of the IMF’s views on capital account liberalization which concluded that the IMF “takes a more 
consistently cautious and nuanced approach to encouraging capital account convertibility; and 
acknowledges the usefulness of capital controls under certain conditions, particularly controls 
on inflows.’ (IEO 2005, 7). 
In general then, the IMF’s institutional view is only incrementally different from the view 
identified by the 2005 IEO report, but the new view goes into much greater detail about 
the nature of capital account liberalization and the specific conditions for the use of capital 
controls (or CFMs). And, while incremental, the substantive changes break significant ground. 
In particular the IMF view has significantly broadened with respect to the multi-lateral aspects 
of regulating financial flows—recognizing the role of source country spillovers and the lack of 
consistency between the guidelines and trade and investment treaties. 
Shortcomings of the iMF View
The IMFs new view is a significant step in the right direction, but it is still out of step with 
country experience and economic thinking in many respects. In general, the IMF view continues 
to insist on eventual capital market liberalization despite the lack of evidence supporting it, is 
too narrow concerning the sanctioned use of CFMs on inflows and outflows, and misses some 
of the logic in the new economics of capital controls with respect to the multi-lateral aspects of 
regulating cross-border finance.
Box 1 outlines the main shortcomings of the IMF´s institutional view on regulating capital 
flows. The IMF continues to advocate for the eventual liberalization of the capital account 
despite the fact that the literature overwhelmingly finds no strong correlation between capital 
account liberalization, growth, and financial stability — especially in EMDs. Indeed, former IMF 
economists Olivier Jeanne and Arvind Subramanian have recently conducted a “meta-regression” 
on the literature and conclude that “the international community should not seek to promote 
totally free trade in assets — even over the long run — because (as we show in this book) free 
capital mobility seems to have little benefit in terms of long-run growth and because there is a 
good case to be made for prudential and non-distortive capital controls” (Jeanne et al. 2012, 5).
The IMF view of managing inflows of capital is also limited. The IMF view stresses that priority 
should be given to letting the exchange rate appreciate, to accumulating reserves, and to 
tightening fiscal policy in order to reduce the amount of capital flowing into an emerging 
market, and that CFMs could be used as a complement to or after such efforts. There is no 
substantive economic basis for this claim. New research in economic theory shows that capital 
controls can be the optimal policy for internalizing the externalities associated with risky 
capital flows (Korinek 2011). Second, econometric analysis by the IMF, NBER and others have 
all shown that capital account regulations have been effective in meeting many of their stated 
goals. Indeed, the IMF’s own research showed that those nations that deployed controls were 
among the least hard hit by the global financial crisis; these studies did not differentiate the 
sequence of use for different measures nor did they distinguish whether such measures were 
market-based and temporary (see Magud et al. 2011, Ostry et al. 2010). 
Regulating capital flows can be an alternative to reserve accumulation. Accumulating reserves 
can be costly to emerging market and developing countries in terms of the opportunity cost of 
investment and sterilization, and some Central Banks may not always have the capacity to sterilize 
without adverse effects (Gallagher and Shrestha 2012; Rodrik 2008; Aizenman 2013). Moreover, 
the accumulation of reserves by developing countries also resulted in global costs in the form the 
global imbalances that played a role in the global financial crisis (Eichengreen 2007).
Tightening fiscal policy also may not be optimal or doable in the short-term and capital 
account regulations can buy time for such an adjustment. First, it has been argued that it is 
undemocratic for fiscal policy to be managed for the benefit of global investors over local 
needs. Second, and more pragmatically, adjustments to fiscal policy are often long, drawn out 
processes that require legislation (see the U.S. debates in 2011 and 2012 for instance). The 
fiscal balance cannot be changed overnight but a Central Bank or Finance Ministry can indeed 
put in CARs overnight to either buy time for (or put up with) a slow moving fiscal cycle.
Finally, it is not always clear that a nation should wait for the exchange rate to float to a 
certain level before utilizing CARs. As Gabor (2011) points out, exchange rate over/under 
valuation is fairly difficult to adequately measure, especially ex-ante. Also, it should be 
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Box 1: The iMF’s “institutional View” on capital Flows: a critical analysis
capital account Liberalization
   IMF continues to recommend capital market liberalization (CML) even though the literature continues to show no 
clear evidence that CML is correlated with growth in emerging market and developing countries
Managing capital inflows
   IMF’s tentative endorsement of capital controls after other measures rests on weak and contradictory economic 
evidence. Aspects that the IMF fails to address include: 
–  CFMs may be necessary for exchange rate management 
–  Very difficult to calculate under/overvaluation 
–  Reserve accumulation may be costly and difficult 
–  Fiscal tightening subjects domestic policy to global finance 
–  Paradox of good fundamentals 
   CARs (or CFMs) need to be permanent features of a counter-cyclical stability policy, and may be necessary for 
exchange rate management and growth policy. 
Managing capital outflows
   Outflow measures may be necessary for source countries to cooperate on both ends of the problem.
  Outflow measures can often deter inflows.
  CARs on outflows may need to be part of counter-cyclical financial policy.
  May be used for exchange rate management and growth tool.
Multi-lateral aspects
   Need to be more specific on those measures that source countries should deploy for global management of capital flows.
   Trade and investment treaties make it difficult for nations to regulate capital flows at either end (i.e., inflows or outflow).
  Economics of spillovers from CARs on inflows need further thinking and testing.
  Forum for international cooperation is needed.
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recognized that some nations see a need for a competitive exchange rate as part of an export-led 
development strategy (Rapetti et al. 2012; Rodrik 2008).
The IMF´s stress that such measures be temporary and not discriminatory also misses some of 
the point. In order for CARs to be part of a counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy, a nation has 
to have permanent authority to use measures as inflows and outflows occur. And by their very 
nature, CARs are discriminatory among residents and non-residents. The IMF’s recommendations 
thus counter their own findings about the kinds of measures that worked. In econometric analyses 
that show a significant impact of capital controls on limiting exchange rate volatility, changing the 
composition of inflows, and allowing monetary policy to be more autonomous, there is no such 
hierarchy of when a nation uses controls, what form they took, and how long they lasted. 
On outflows the IMF ignores its own research that shows measures on capital outflows can be 
useful in preventing excessive inflows of capital. In addition, many countries in transition to more 
openness or in the process of development may need to deploy measures to curtail outflows in 
order to steer credit toward productive development (Epstein 2012; Lewis 1954 ,Ocampo 2012). 
Instead, the IMF only sanctions measures on outflows in the middle of a financial crisis. Focus on 
outflows is particularly important for the poorest countries. Least developed countries often do 
not experience massive inflow surges but do experience massive outflows (UNCTAD 2012).
The IMF’s concern about the spillover effects of the prudential use of capital controls is 
unfounded. Korinek (2012) has shown that regulating capital flows in an efficient manner may 
cause increases or decreases of capital in neighboring countries that may not necessarily be 
“negative” spillovers in the economic sense. By design, an optimal tax on inflows lowers demand 
for inflows and thus interest rates may drop and cause more inflows in neighboring countries. 
This is the invisible hand at work. Those inflows to neighboring countries may not be negative—it 
really depends on the stock and composition of investment, the deepness of its capital markets, 
its current account balance, and its level of regulation. And, even if a nation chooses not to put 
in place regulations, the cost of a negative spillover may be far outweighed by the benefit of not 
being the recipient of contagion in the form of crisis.
The IMF is right to point out that source country policies “have likely affected the volume and 
volatility of capital flows to both advanced and emerging market economies”(IMF 2012b, 22). 
However, the IMF view lacks the level of specificity and scrutiny to source country policies as there 
is for emerging markets in the new view. Whereas the new view scrutinizes the exact types of capital 
account regulations in emerging markets, it does not equally examine which types of monetary and 
regulatory policy trigger the most risky capital flows from developed to developing countries.
The IMF is aware of the fact that it may recommend capital controls to nations that do not 
have the policy space to deploy CFMs because they would be deemed actionable under a trade 
agreement or investment treaty. The IMF final report says: 
“As noted, the Fund’s proposed institutional view would not (and legally could not) alter members’ rights and 
obligations under other international agreements. Rather, conformity with obligations under other agreements 
would continue to be determined solely by the existing provisions of those agreements. Thus, for example, even 
where the proposed Fund institutional view recognizes the use of inflow or outflow CFMs as an appropriate policy 
response, these measures could still violate a member‘s obligations under other international agreements if those 
agreements do not have temporary safeguard provisions compatible with the Fund‘s approach (IMF, 2012b, 42).”
The Pardee Center Task Force convened a “compatibility review” between capital account 
regulations and the trading system in 2012 that confirms that many trade and investment treaties 
lack the appropriate safeguards (Gallagher and Stanley, 2012). At the World Trade Organization 
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(WTO) nations that have made commitments to liberalize trade in cross-border financial 
services are not permitted to regulate capital flows. Although the WTO has more appropriate 
safeguards than many regional and bilateral agreements, there is considerable debate whether 
those safeguards amply allow nations to regulate capital flows, especially on inflows. In the case 
of regional and bilateral agreements, especially those of the United States, all forms of capital 
must flow “freely and without delay” among trade and investment partners, with no exception.
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Box 2: rules of Thumb for the use of capital account regulations in developing countries
Capital Account Regulations (CARs) should be seen as an essential part of the macroeconomic policy toolkit and not seen 
as measures of last resort.
CARs should be considered differently in nations where the capital account is still largely closed versus those nations 
where CARs are prudential regulations to manage an open capital account.
Price-based CARs have the advantage of being more market neutral, but quantity-based CARs may be more effective, 
especially in nations with relatively closed capital accounts, weaker central banks, or when incentives to bring in capital 
are very large.
CARs should not only be relegated to regulations on capital inflows. Capital outflow restrictions may be among the most 
significant deterrents of undesirable inflows and can serve other uses as well.
CARs can be seen as alternatives to foreign exchange reserve accumulation, particularly to reduce the costs of reserve 
accumulation.
CARs should not be seen as solely temporary measures, but should be thought of as permanent mechanisms to be used in 
a counter-cyclical way to smooth booms and busts. Their permanence will strengthen institutional capacity to implement 
them effectively.
Investors can increasingly circumvent CARs through mis-invoicing trade flows, derivative operations, or foreign direct 
investments that are in fact debt flows.
Therefore, CARs should be seen as dynamic, requiring a significant degree of market monitoring and ‘fine-tuning’ as 
investors adapt and circumvent regulation.
It may be useful for effective CARs to distinguish between residents and non-residents.
The full burden of managing capital flows should not be on emerging market and developing countries, but the ‘source’ 
countries of capital flows should also play a role in capital flow management, including supporting the effectiveness of those 
regulations put in place by recipient countries.
Neither industrialized nations nor international institutions should limit the ability of nations to deploy CARs whether 
through trade and investment treaties or through loan conditionality.
Industrialized nations should examine more fully the global spillover effects of their own monetary policies and evaluate 
measures to reduce excessive outflows of short-term capital that can be undesirable both for them and emerging countries. 
The stigma attached to CARs should be removed, so nations have ample confidence that they will not be rebuked for taking 
action. The IMF could play a valuable role in taking away the stigma of CARs, as well as doing comparative analysis of which 
CARs are most effective.
Source: Gallagher et al, 2011
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The IMF suggests that its new institutional view could help guide future trade treaties and that 
the IMF could serve as a forum for such discussions. It is important that the IMF recognizes 
that many nations will lack the policy space to implement new policy advice from the IMF. 
However, given that the IMF view is overly narrow, it is imperative that future safeguards for 
trade and investment treaties not simply defer to the IMF on capital account regulations. 
While the IMF has legal authority on current transactions, this new view does not grant the 
IMF authority over the capital account.
regulating capital Flows for development: an alternative View
It is important to note that the new IMF view is not a legally binding set of guidelines in any 
form. IMF member nations are still free to regulate their capital accounts as they see fit.  
Article VI of the IMF Articles of Agreement still stands: “Members may exercise such controls 
as are necessary to regulate international capital movements.” The IMF is making strides 
in the right direction, but the lead will have to continue to come from the example of many 
emerging markets. Developing countries remain the best judges of their own economies and 
should look at the new IMF advice on financial globalization with great scrutiny. 
The Pardee Center Task Force’s “rules of thumb” in Box 2 may serve as a more comprehensive 
and flexible set of guideposts for emerging market and developing countries hoping to achieve 
financial stability for inclusive growth and sustainable development. •
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